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This monograph forms part of a series of disease monographs commissioned by the 
International Development Research Centre over the period Nov 2015 to April 2016 to 
inform funding priorities for the Livestock Vaccine Innovation Fund (LVIF). The LVIF is a 
seven-and-a-half year, CA$57 million partnership between the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s International Development Research 
Centre. It focuses on those animal diseases posing the greatest risk to poor livestock 
keepers in Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, targeting transboundary 
diseases to achieve lasting regional impact. 
 
The content presented here is as submitted by the consultant(s) involved and has been 
edited for appearance only. The views, information, or opinions expressed in this 
monograph are solely those of the individual consultant(s) involved and do not 
necessarily represent those of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Global Affairs Canada 
and International Development Research Centre, or any of their employees. Sections of 
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AGID  Agar Gel Immunodiffusion assay 
AI  Avian influenza 
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations 
AU-IBAR African Union InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources 
AU  African Union 
DIVA   Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals (strategy) 
DVE  Duck virus enteritis (duck plague) 
ELISA  Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
H  Hemagglutinin subtype (e.g. H5) 
HA  Hemagglutination antigen 
HI  Hemagglutination inhibition 
IB  Infectious bronchitis 
IBD  Infectious bursal disease 
HPAI  Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
IVPI  Intravenous pathogenicity index 
LBM  Live bird market 
LPAI  Low pathogenic avian influenza 
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N  Neuraminidase subtype (e.g. N1) 
NA  Neuraminidase antigen 
NDV  Newcastle disease virus 
NI  Neuraminidase inhibition 
OIE  World Organization for Animal Health 
RT-PCR  Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
SAARC  South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation 
SEPRL  Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory 
TADs  Transboundary animal diseases 
USA  United States of America 
VI  Virus isolation 
WAHID  Interface for the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) 
WAHIS  World Animal Health Information System (database) 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Avian influenza (AI) belongs to a highly mutable, reportable group of Type A influenza viruses, some of which are 
zoonotic.  AI viruses in poultry are classified as either low pathogenic (LPAI) or highly pathogenic (HPAI) based on 
the clinical signs and mortality with a chicken host challenge model.  Three major waves occurred in Europe 
between 1876 and 1931 following the initial identification of the agent of “fowl plague” near the end of the 19th 
Century. Over a span of 136 years between 1876 and 2012, there were at least 97 epizootics of AI recorded 
globally [8].  AI viruses in poultry are classified as either low pathogenic (LPAI) or highly pathogenic (HPAI) based 
on the clinical signs and mortality with a chicken host challenge model. 
The epidemiology of avian influenza viruses can be understood following the principle of the epidemiological 
triad, including agent, host and environmental characteristics.  Waterfowl, both domesticated and wild play an 
important role as the sometimes “silent” reservoir, particularly in Asia. Waterfowl promote endemicity of the 
virus in this region, unlike Africa.  H5N1 Eurasian subtype is only the second recorded AI virus to kill its waterfowl 
reservoir hosts. H9N2 subtype is also a zoonosis and warrants further scrutiny and attention. 
Detection of AI through surveillance and measuring the socio-economic impact remain challenging, despite a 
total 844 human cases and 449 deaths due to H5N1 resulting in a case fatality rate of 53% since 2003.  
Unprecedented prior to 1997, H5N1, H7N9 and H9N2 have been most commonly associated with human 
morbidity and mortality.  The case fatality rate greatly exceeds that of annual season influenza in humans.  
Prevention and control of AI is deemed to serve the Global Public Good, however, veterinary capacity in many 
developing and developed countries remains limited [27].   
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) guidance for the prevention and control of HPAI H5N1 include humane culling of affected stock, 
movement control, disease surveillance, biosecurity, and vaccination.  Vaccination is only one tool which can 
used, however by itself cannot eliminate the virus.  Vaccine also places further selection pressure for additional 
drift and adaptation.  Both technical and non-technical factors should be considered when applying vaccination 
judiciously.  Inactivated, recombinant and vectored vaccines and related research are reviewed. 
 
Gaps in knowledge or capacity impacting strategic planning and effective implementation   
The following gaps are highlighted in relation to vaccine development and sustainable field implementation for 
avian influenza: 
1. The extent of AI vaccine used which does not conform to the OIE standards for quality of vaccines 
produced; 
Avian Influenza | Monograph 04 






2. The need for environmental assessments of replicating recombinant vector vaccines; 
3. The need to develop non-replicating recombinant vector vaccines in order to speed up vaccine licensing 
and registration; 
4. Standardized laboratory diagnosis of AI using approved reagents, including primers; 
5. Lack of active and passive surveillance systems; 
6. Effective programmatic implementation of Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) 
strategy in more developed and less developed countries remains a challenge.  Challenges are related to 
policy uncertainties as well as laboratory, field epidemiology and operational capacity limitations. 
7. China, Viet Nam and Indonesia have ceased to vaccinate smallholder poultry.  Sustainable models for 
successful community engagement to improve logistics and delivery of AI vaccine for smallholders.  
 
Options and Strategies for Vaccination 
Vaccination induces protection to poultry mediated through humoral, cellular, and innate immunity. The 
immunity that results from vaccination does not provide sterilizing immunity, but it can reduce clinical signs and 
mortality and reduce virus shedding, resulting in reduced contact transmission among poultry. Inactivated 
vaccines are most commonly used against H5N1 virus, including traditional and reverse genetics vaccines; 
however, a number of live-vector vaccines are being increasingly used [29][30]. Key strategic considerations include 
[7][33]: 
1. Vaccine quality, selection, non-replicating and regular matching with circulating field strains; 
2. Vaccination strategy – mass/targeted; prophylactic use in breeders/rare breeds; emergency use to 
protect poultry, farmers and public health; selection of target group; 
3. Implementation of vaccination program – public-private partnerships, logistics, procurement, storage, 
cold chain delivery system, quality control (records) 
4. Post-vaccination seromonitoring and evaluation of the vaccination program disease surveillance, and 
operational research studies to assess impact. 
5. Use of multivalent vaccines may be a scientifically valid approach to take when it is possible.  The reality 
in the field is that many economically significant poultry diseases are neither reported nor assessed 
quantitatively. Vaccine cost as well as farmer and government perception of risk must be carefully 
assessed in order to prioritize resources for sustainable, self-directed vaccination programs. Needs 
assessments of the primary stakeholders should first be conducted prior to embarking on prevention 
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and control through vaccination. In this way, vaccination, biosecurity training and surveillance systems 
incorporated specific measures for priority diseases as well as AI.  The use of NDV-AI vaccines can be 
considered depending on the results of an epidemiological risk assessment. 
Short-, medium- and long-term strategies are proposed to inform the future Livestock Vaccination Innovation 
Fund as it moves ahead to address this important disease agent from global to local levels.  
Short-term Solutions:  Inactivated AI vaccines are still effective, produce good titers and can be applied to short-
lived poultry.  One dose might work for short-lived birds.  Proper delivery of vaccine to smallholder with 
community engagement is a key gap to overcome logistical challenges for the safe and effective delivery of 
vaccine. 
Medium-term Solutions: Some replicating and especially non-replicating recombinant vector vaccines hold 
promise to minimize barriers to wider and more timely legal licensure, registration and use, particularly for 
bivalent NDV-AI combinations for chickens and other gallinaceous poultry. 
Long-term Solutions: There are two main needs:  1) development of a greater variety of non-replicating AI vector 
vaccine models, which can be scaled up rapidly, and are environmentally safe; and 2) development of a safe, 
non-replicating effective bivalent Duck virus enteritis-avian influenza (DVE-AI) vaccine for ducks, particularly in 
Asia. 
  
Avian Influenza | Monograph 04 














Influenza viruses belong to the family 
Orthomyxoviridae that cause febrile catarrhal 
respiratory disease of the upper respiratory tract in 
humans, horses, dogs, domestic pigs, avian species, 
mink and a variety of marine mammals including 
seals.  Orthomyxoviruses are classified as either 
Types A, B or C with Type A being most pathogenic 
historically.  
Avian influenza is a highly mutable Type A influenza 
virus (commonly referred to as influenza A).  The 
lipid envelope makes it unstable and relatively 
susceptible to environmental destruction from 
ultraviolet light, chemicals, desiccation, etc. 
The hemagglutinin (HA) antigen is a protein that 
provides the mechanism for host cell entry while 
the neuraminidase (NA) protein permits exit of 
newly replicated virions from the host cell.  
Proteolytic cleavage of HA into HA1 and HA2 is 
required for fusion of the virion with the host cell 
membrane and thus, for infectivity. The HA protein 
is the major antigen which stimulates the host 
immune response and protective antibodies to protect against clinical signs and death. There are at least 16 H 
strains and 9 N strains, which can result in 144 possible combinations and permutations and this forms the basis 
for serological classification based on the hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) and neuraminidase inhibition (NI) tests.  
Virus structure 
The virion is composed of a helical nucelocapsid containing 8 
segments of single-stranded RNA which codes for 10 proteins 
eight (8) of which are structural (HA, NA, NP, M1, M2, PB1, 
PB2 and PA) and two of which are non-structural provided by 
the host (NS1, NS2).  Virus replication of this single stranded 
RNA virus is highly variable, resulting in a constantly evolving 
and highly mutable virus [1]. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic structural components of am 
influenza virion 
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Virus nomenclature is based on subtype, influenza type, species source, location found, strain number and year 
of isolation e.g. H5N2 A/chicken/Pennsylvania, 1370/83. 
Antigenic variation of the HA and NA surface glycoproteins occurs at a high frequency through minor “drift” 
changes and may be associated with immune pressure through vaccination of poultry.  Major antigenic “shift” in 
the HA and NA coding proteins is the result of genetic re-assortment between gene segments of two different 
influenza virus strains (subtypes) in host cells commonly occurs, particularly in live bird markets (LBM) where 
mixing of domestic waterfowl and poultry is an ongoing process of the poultry value chains in the majority of 
developed and developing countries.  
AI viruses in poultry are classified as either low pathogenic (LPAI) or highly pathogenic (HPAI) based on the 
clinical signs and mortality with a chicken host challenge model.  The criteria for HPAI specified by the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) are as follows [2]: 
 
The longer LPAI viruses are permitted to circulate in a poultry population, the higher the potential to adapt to 
the new host and to become more pathogenic in poultry. Historically, LPAI H5 and H7 subtypes are most likely to 
evolve into become highly pathogenic [4]. 
Avian influenza viruses preferentially bind to upper respiratory epithelium on sialoligosaccharide α2,3 receptors, 
human influenza viruses bind at sialoligosaccharide α2,6 receptors and pigs (swine) possess both receptor types.  
For this reason, pigs are considered a “mixing vessel” between avian and human species.  However since 1996 
and 2013, respectively the evolution of H5N1 and H7N9 subtypes directly from avian species to humans is now 





1. One of the two following methods to determine pathogenicity in chickens is used. A high pathogenicity 
influenza A virus is:  
. i) any influenza A virus that is lethal for six, seven or eight of eight 4- to 8-week-old susceptible 
chickens within 10 days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 1/10 dilution of a 
bacteria-free, infective allantoic fluid or 
. ii) any influenza A virus that has an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2. 
2. For all H5 and H7 viruses of low pathogenicity in chickens, the amino acid sequence of the connecting peptide 
of the hemagglutinin must be determined. If the sequence is similar to that observed for other HPAI isolates, 
the isolate being tested will be considered to be HPAI [4]. 
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HPAI viruses are reported more frequently globally than LPAI, as they are reportable by the OIE member countries.  
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the respective global spatial and temporal distributions of general avian influenza 




Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Avian Influenza Viruses Reported to OIE in 2015 [6] 
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Figure 3: Temporal Distribution of H5N1 HPAI Viruses, 2003-2013 [7] 
 
Following the initial identification of the agent of “fowl plague” near the end of the 19th Century three major 
waves of AI in poultry occurred in Europe between 1876 and 1931. Over a span of 136 years between 1876 and 
2012, there were at least 97 epizootics of AI recorded globally [8]. Within this historical context, the scale and 
scope of the recent highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 epizootic is one of the largest recorded.  
Since 2003, H5N1 subtype has been reported in poultry or wild birds from 50 countries as noted in Figure 3 [8].  
Figure 4 presents a predictive map to assess future risk of avian influenza viruses in globally, including Africa and 
Asia [8]: 
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Figure 4: Spread of H5N1 in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Pie charts show the total number of infectious bird 
days (number of infected birds days shedding virus) and fraction from each pathway for birds moving 
between previous H5N1 outbreak countries and the focal country [8]. 
 
The epidemiology of avian influenza viruses is examined in terms of the epidemiological triad, including agent, 
host and environmental characteristics. 
 
Agent Factors 
Avian influenza viruses are highly mutable and relatively susceptible to environmental degradation [1].  Several 
avian influenza viruses are considered zoonoses, causing mortality and morbidity in humans including H5N1 
(globally), H7N7 (Netherlands), H7N9 and H9N2 (China and Hong Kong) [5].  Importantly, H7N9 is the first LPAI 
virus reported to cause mortality in humans.  Inter-species spillover and transmission has been documented 
between avian species, swine and humans.  This linkage is based on molecular receptor binding affinity.  To 
improve resolution of disease risk at the human-animal interface, H5N1 HPAI viruses have been sub-classified 
according to Clades, or a group of AI viruses that share a common ancestor.  There are at least 10 Clade groups 
currently identified by the OIE and FAO Network of expertise on animal influenza (OFFLU) [9]. 
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Both antigenic shift and drift are important mechanisms for virus evolution.  The presence of co-circulating 
reasserting subtypes among dense poultry populations adds pressure for antigenic shift.  LPAI H9N2 has 
circulated for decades in countries from North Africa to the East China coastline and contributed its 6 internal 
genes to H5N1, H5N6, H5N8, H7N9 and H10N8.  During late 2014 and early 2015, H5N2 Clade 2.3.4.6 from 
Eastern China has been identified as the likely precursor of H5N8 reported in China, Japan, North Korea and 
Europe as well as H5N6 reported in China, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. Intrinsic subtype specific antigenic drift is 
associated with the frequency and distribution of infection in a poultry population as naive populations are 
exposed to new variants.  Vaccination is also thought to exert selection pressure on the virus to increase the 
mutation rate by several orders of magnitude [10]. 
In addition, evolution of new clade types can change the morbidity and mortality.  In Indonesia and Cambodia 
prior to 2012, clade 2.2 and clade 1.1 were predominant respectively, with mortality in domestic ducks of less 
than 10%. With the introduction of clade 3.2.1, duck mortality was reported to be greater than 40% and up to 
90% depending on the age of the ducks.  
Finally, host-virus interaction is critical in determining the evolutionary polarity and survival of a particular virus 
subtype and clade in a population, either wild or domesticated.  As a virus is transferred from wild birds to 
poultry, natural selection within the host favours greater adapted strains, which often become more pathogenic 
for both LPAI and HPAI pathotypes [1]. 
 
Host Factors 
Under the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code poultry “means all domesticated birds, including backyard poultry, 
used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for 
restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any 
purpose” [2].  
Transmission may be due to direct contact with oropharyngeal secretions, respiratory aerosols or cloacal 
content of infected birds.  Indirect contact also occurs including fomite transmission (contaminated vehicles, egg 
cartons, vaccination equipment, etc.) and human movement.  Thorough cleaning and disinfection is essential in 
order to remove all organic material, which may be potentially contaminated. 
In the 1960’s, LPAI was discovered in wild bird breeding grounds constituting the reservoir for all avian influenza 
viruses [1]. Once LPAI viruses spill over from wild birds to poultry, specifically LPAI H5 and H7 subtypes 
demonstrate the potential to mutate into HPAI pathotypes as the virus circulates in poultry population.  In 1998, 
this occurred in Italy over a six-month period however, a review of OIE reports and published studies illustrate 
that this process can take weeks to years to occur, depending on a number of epidemiological factors.  
Historically, there have been only two reported instances when an HPAI virus caused mortality in reservoir 
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hosts: i) in 1961 H5N3 HPAI resulted in sudden death on the South African coast; and ii) Eurasian H5N1 which 
was first detected in 1996 in Hong Kong (A/goose/ Guangdong/1/1996) (1,6). 
Avian influenza virus has been isolated from the following orders of wild avian species: Anseriformes (waterfowl, 
such as ducks, geese and swans); Charadriiformes, including the Laridae (gulls and terns) and Scolopacidae 
(shorebirds).  Some aquatic species in other orders might also be maintenance hosts. LPAI viruses is not often 
detected in most wild birds that live on land however, these birds such as passerine and Corbids (crows) can also 
become infected as reported from India in 2011 (OIE WAHID, 2012 
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/temp/reports/en_fup_0000011490_20120113_144638.pdf  (Accessed 19 
November 2015)).  
Swine are important mixing vessels for LPAI viruses in areas when they are located near large poultry 
populations such as turkeys in Minnesota and North Carolina, USA.  However, swine do not play a significant role 
in relation to the epidemiology of Eurasian H5N1 HPAI [1]. 
Significantly, waterfowl (e.g. ducks and geese) and water birds (e.g. egrets) can be both high-risk reservoirs and 
asymptomatic carriers for the introduction, transmission and endemicity of avian influenza virus among various 
poultry subpopulations [1]. Countries in Southeast and South Asia have proportionately large duck populations 
and China, the origin of H5N1 virus, A/goose/ Guangdong/1/1996.  China possesses 70% of the global waterfowl 
population [7].  The role of wild birds in the introduction and spread of avian influenza is poorly defined and 
therefore be considered in the context of specific spatial and temporal risks in each area.  FAO recently compiled 
a summary of key studies supporting or refuting the role of wild birds, presented below. 
Waterfowl (domesticated or wild) and gallinaceous poultry may possess cross-immunity if previously exposed to 
the homologous or a closely related H subtype.  Specifically, research has revealed a certain level of cross-
protection of H5N1 due to previous exposure with H9N2 [12].  This is biologically plausible due to the commonly 
shared conserved genes in both virus subtypes, which are widely present in Asian countries. 
 
Table 1:   The role of wild birds in past and current avian influenza events [11] 
Risk Factor Reference 
Initial introduction of HPAI associated with long 
distance transmission from infected areas through 
migratory birds  
Si et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2012 
Disease persistence and spread associated with 
poultry population densities, human population 
Gilbert and Pfeiffer, 2012 
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The species, breed, strain and age of the host are critical demographic factors that determine host susceptibility, 
morbidity and mortality following virus entry and replication. In general gallinaceous birds (chickens, turkeys, 
game birds) are more susceptible than waterfowl [1].  Young ducks infected with H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1 experience 
high morbidity and mortality than older ducks.  Quail are effective amplifiers of AI virus and have been implicated 
in the early outbreaks of H5N1 in Hong Kong.  They also possess α2,3 linkage receptors in the respiratory tract 
epithelium and α2,6 linkage receptors in the gastro-enteric epithelium.  Although not definitively proven, quail 
may potentially amplify spread of LPAI or HPAI with specific receptor binding affinity for humans [1]. 
Intensive and extensive poultry production systems influence the introduction and transmission of AI virus among 
the poultry populations.  Both commercial and small village based systems are at risk and the Basic Reproductive 
Number (R0), or rate of transmission in the population is variable depending on biosecurity risk, contact type and 
contact frequency.  Housing management systems using confined cages versus either free access solid or slatted 
density, land-use patterns, and movement of poultry 
and humans  
Chicken density  Pfeiffer et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2008; 
Martin et al., 2011 
Duck density  
 
Gilbert et al., 2006 
Anthropogenic variables such as human population 
density have been correlated with HPAI H5N1 risk due 
to poultry trading and marketing practices  
Gilbert et al., 2008; Tiensin et al., 2009; Van Boeckel et al., 
2012; Loth et al., 2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2007; Martin et al., 
2011; Ward et al., 2008 
Road networks are associated with risk of HPAI H5N1 
outbreaks  
Paul et al., 2009; Yupiana et al., 2010; Biswas et al., 2009; 
Ward et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2011 
Intensification of poultry production may also 
contribute to increase in HPAI risk  
Van Boeckel et al., 2012 
Land-cover, such as river networks, presence of inland 
water bodies are associated with HPAI risk as a direct 
risk to both poultry and humans; virus can remain 
infective for several days at ambient water 
temperature 
Nazir et al., 2010; Vong et al., 2009 
Spatial and temporal clusters of HPAI have also been 
identified sometimes associated with rice cultivation 
Tiensin et al., 2009; Pfeiffer et al., 2007; Henning et al., 2009; 
Minh et al., 2009; Ahmed et al., 2010; Loth et al., 2010; 
Ekong et al., 2012 
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flooring systems are also associated with the contact rate and virus transmission rate.  Although poultry housed 
within cages are at high contact, there is relatively limited contact among different penned groups of birds in 
caged systems. This is in contrast with high contact rates possible in floor housing systems where birds wander 
freely throughout the poultry house.  
The type of production system is critical in order to assess risk of exposure. Epidemiologically, the generation 
interval of long-lived poultry (egg layers and breeders, heavy weight meat birds) results in a longer duration of 
exposure to AI virus as compared with short-lived poultry (broilers, light weight meat birds). 
Immunosuppressive disease agents of poultry are critical factors to evaluate and include: i) bacteria including E. 
coli, Pasteurella multocida, Salmonella sp., etc.; ii) aflatoxins from feed; and iii) other viruses such as infectious 
bursal disease virus, Newcastle disease virus, infectious bronchitis virus, chicken infectious anaemia virus, etc. [1]. 
The presence of immunosuppressive disease reduces the infectious dose and has been associated with morbidity 
and mortality due to both LPAI and HPAI co-infection. Therefore, general health screening for concurrent diseases 




Agro-ecological factors (with references) that have thus far been associated with risk for introduction or 
transmission of H5N1 HPAI among poultry are summarized in Table 2 [11].   
The economic, policy and political environment also act as drivers for AI introduction and transmission.  These 
drivers include high demand for poultry in a cross border area, price differentials and non-harmonized culling and 
compensation policies of neighbouring countries [14][15].  Value chain analysis and social network analyses are 
therefore important tools, which can be used to characterize the players, power structures and movement 
patterns within and across national boundaries and the risks associated with these movements [16]. 
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Table 2: Agro-ecological risk factors for H5N1 HPAI from published peer-reviewed references 
 
Risk Factor Reference 
Initial introduction of HPAI associated with long distance transmission 
from infected areas through migratory birds  
Si et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2012 
Disease persistence and spread associated with poultry population 
densities, human population density, land-use patterns, and 
movement of poultry and humans  
Gilbert and Pfeiffer, 2012 
Chicken density  Pfeiffer et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2008; Ward 
et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2011 
Duck density  Gilbert et al., 2006 
Anthropogenic variables such as human population density have been 
correlated with HPAI H5N1 risk due to poultry trading and marketing 
practices  
Gilbert et al., 2008; Tiensin et al., 2009; Van 
Boeckel et al., 2012; Loth et al., 2010; Pfeiffer 
et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2011; Ward et al., 
2008 
Road networks are associated with risk of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks  Paul et al., 2009; Yupiana et al., 2010; Biswas 
et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2008; Martin et al., 
2011 
Intensification of poultry production may also contribute to increase 
in HPAI risk  
Van Boeckel et al., 2012 
Land-cover, such as river networks, presence of inland water bodies 
are associated with HPAI risk as a direct risk to both poultry and 
humans; virus can remain infective for several days at ambient water 
temperature 
Nazir et al., 2010; Vong et al., 2009 
Spatial and temporal clusters of HPAI have also been identified 
sometimes associated with rice cultivation 
Tiensin et al., 2009; Pfeiffer et al., 2007; 
Henning et al., 2009; Minh et al., 2009; 
Ahmed et al., 2010; Loth et al., 2010; Ekong 
et al., 2012 
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Avian influenza viruses remained viable from < 1 day to 7 days at temperatures of 15-35°C (59-95°F) under 
laboratory conditions. At colder temperatures (4°C; 39°F), virus survival in feces ranged from less than 4 days to 
at least 30-40 days in different experiments. When protected from sunlight, virus persistence on various 
surfaces, or in soil, ranged from less than 2 days to more than 2 weeks (and possibly several months), at 
temperatures ranging from 4°C to 15-30°C (59-86°F). Two studies suggest that virus survival might be 
particularly prolonged on feathers. In poultry meat (pH 7), a virus survived for 6 months at 4°C. Environmental 
sampling in Cambodia suggest that avian influenza Eurasian lineage H5N1 virus may survive only several days in 




The HA gene determines the pathogenicity of an AI virus in poultry.  The HA cleavability by the host cell at the 
receptor binding site on the cell membrane is the key interaction producing HA1 and HA2 cleavage by-products 
permitting cell entry.  The hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) test from egg inoculation remains the gold standard test 
for avian influenza virus [2].  However, clinical signs are in no way pathognomonic for AI, either LPAI or HPAI.  Major 
determinants of clinical signs observed include: 
1. The pathotype (LPAI or HPAI);  
2. H and N Subtype; 
3. Clade; 
4. Exposure history;  
5. Host characteristics (discussed above); 
6. Presence of concurrent (immunosuppressive) disease, including regionally endemic LPAI viruses such as H9N2 
documented in Asia and Egypt. 
 
The official incubation period set by the OIE is 21 days [2].  However, the biological incubation period for individual 
and flock level challenge is considered 3 to 14 days [1].  Clinical signs of avian influenza are highly variable among 
and within each avian species.  Peracute death can occur without exhibiting prior clinical signs associated with 
avian influenza virus. The following table summarizes an array of clinical signs that may be observed in 
domesticated gallinaceous birds and waterfowl infected with avian influenza virus [1][17][18]. 
Waterfowl infected with LPAI viruses are typically asymptomatic, however suppressed T-cell production and 
depression in egg production has been reported in mallard ducks [1].   
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Table 3:   Clinical signs of LPAI and HPAI viruses in gallinaceous birds and waterfowl 
 
Clinical Signs Gallinaceous Poultry Waterfowl 
LPAI HPAI LPAI HPAI 
Depression + +++ -/+ -/+++ 
Decreased intake of water and feed  + +++  -/+++ 
Peracute death - +/+++  +/+++ 
Coughing, sneezing, rales, sinusitis, 
lacrimation (upper airway) 
++ +/+++ -/+ +/+++ 
Oedema of the face, head and neck -/+ +++ -/+ -/+++ 
Reduced vocalization (cathedral syndrome) - +++ - NA 
Haemorrhage and necrosis of the skin 
including comb, wattles, leg shanks 
- -/+++ - NA 
Broodiness -/+++ - - - 
Drop in egg production +/++ +++ -/+ NA 
Mortality threshold (% if specific estimate 
given or symbol) 
<5% or higher 
with 
secondary 
infection or in 
young <3 
months 
Up to 97% - -/+++ especially 
in young <3 
months 
Diarrhea - +/+++ - +/+++ 
Nervous signs: Torticollis, opisthotonus, 
paralysis 
-/+ +/+++ - +/+++ 
Corneal opacity - - - -/+++ 
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LPAI only have one single basic amino acid (arginine) at the glycosylation site at amino acid 13 that shields the 
proteolytic cleavage site.  LPAI primarily affects the upper respiratory tract of poultry; typically show mild 
respiratory signs such as coughing, snicking (sneezing), and lacrimation. Other common signs of LPAI include 
depression, ruffled feathers, decreased water and feed consumption and possible diarrhea.  Egg yolk peritonitis 
is a common sequelae to respiratory disease, resulting in a drop in egg production and increased broodiness of 
laying hens and breeders.   
Highly pathogenic avian influenza induces a multi-systemic infection due to the presence of multiple basic amino 
acids located near the HA1 cleavage site, which can be cleaved by ubiquitous furin and trypsin enzymes 
throughout the body including digestive, nervous and cardiovascular systems. Typical clinical signs of LPAI and 





The following diseases must be considered in the differential diagnosis of virulent AI causing sudden high 
mortality [18] 
: Newcastle disease; infectious laryngotracheitis; duck plague/duck virus enteritis; acute poisonings.  Other 
diseases causing swelling of the combs and wattles: acute fowl cholera; and other septicemic and bacterial 
diseases affecting the comb and wattles.  Milder forms of AI may be confused with, or complicated by, many 
other diseases with respiratory or enteric signs. AI should be suspected in any disease outbreak in poultry that 
persists despite the application of preventive and therapeutic measures for other diseases. 
 
Gross pathology 
The hemagglutinin inhibition test from egg inoculation remains the gold standard test for avian influenza virus 
[3].  Gross pathological features are highly variable and in no way pathognomonic for either LPAI or HPAI 
pathotypes.  The following list summarizes the gross lesions found [1][18]. 
LPAI 
• Chickens: Upper airway catarrhal, fibrinous, serofibrinous, mucopurulent or fibrinopurulent 
inflammation; tracheal oedema, congestion, +/- haemorrhages with serous and caseous exudate and 
asphyxiation; infraorbital sinus swelling filled with mucus with mucopurulent discharge; Fibrinopurulent 
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bronchopneumonia with secondary bacterial infection; “egg yolk” peritonitis with exudate in ovary and 
oviduct and misshapen eggs. 
• Waterfowl: Upper airway Sinusitis with discharge; conjunctivitis; air sacculitis, fibrinous to 
fibrinopurulent exudate and inflammation with secondary bacteria. 
HPAI 
• Chickens: Haemorrhage and necrosis of the skin including comb, wattles, leg shanks; subcutaneous 
oedema and haemorrhages; Severe oedema of face, head, neck haemorrhage and necrosis, particularly 
Peyer’s patches, pancreas, spleen; Peracute death with no lesions; diffuse interstitial pneumonia, with 
fluid and haemorrhage; Haemorrhage (petechial/echymotic) in pericardium, pectoral muscle, 
proventriculus and ventriculus;  
• Waterfowl: Severe congestion and edema in lung; severe necrotizing tracheitis; congestion and small 
necrotic foci in spleen; multifocal pancreatic necrosis; congestion and small foci of hepatic necrosis; 
brain and viscera very congested; corneal opacity; multiple small foci of necrosis with some gliosis in 
brain; severe tracheitis; multifocal pancreatic necrosis; severe renal congestion.  
 
Diagnostic Tests 




Specimens should be collected from birds showing signs of acute disease or recently dead (<24 h). Swabs are taken from 
the cloacae and oropharynx/trachea of sick and dead birds and then be stored in 3 ml of viral transport medium at low 
temperature. For dead birds, 3 groups of organs should be separately collected during the necropsy and stored in viral 
transport medium. These are trachea/lung, brain and digestive organs (pancreas, proventriculus, cecae, intestine). All 
any obviously abnormal tissue has also to be sampled. Blood should also be collected from live and dead birds (heart 
blood) for serum testing. Viral transport media can either be prepared locally at a laboratory (it can be isotonic 
phosphate buffered saline (PBS), pH 7.0-7.4, containing antibiotics, for example 100 g/ml gentamicin sulfate, 2 g/ml 
amphotericin B) or commercial medium may be purchased. Samples should be taken from several birds in the same 
suspicion flock.   
Transport: 
Tissues and swab material should be chilled at 4 °C and forwarded on water ice or with frozen gel packs. If delays of 
greater than 48 hours are expected in transit, these specimens should be frozen at -80 °C and forwarded with dry ice or 
liquid nitrogen. 
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International test standards and methods for the diagnosis of AI in avian species are presented below in Table 4 
[2]. 
 





























HI +++ (H5 or H7) ++ (H5 or H7) +++ (H5 or H7) 
++ 
(convalescent) +++ (H5 or H7 +++ (H5 or H7) 
ELISA + + ++ +  (convalescent) ++ ++ 
Key: +++ = recommended method; ++ = suitable method; + = may be used in some situations, but cost, reliability, or other 
factors severely limits its application; – = not appropriate for this purpose. 
Although not all of the tests listed as category +++ or ++ have undergone formal validation, their routine nature and the fact that 
they have been used widely without dubious results, makes them acceptable.  
RT-PCR = reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction; AGID = agar gel immunodiffusion;  
HI = haemagglutination inhibition test; ELISA = enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. 
Virus isolation is the “gold standard” but laborious and time insensitive, used primarily for diagnosis of 
first clinical case and to obtain virus isolated for further laboratory analysis.  
Samples taken from dead birds should include intestinal contents (faeces) or cloacal swabs and 
oropharyngeal swabs. Samples from trachea, lungs, air sacs, intestine, spleen, kidney, brain, liver and 
heart should also be collected and processed either separately or as a pool.  
Samples from live birds should include both oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs. To avoid harming them, 
swabbing of small delicate birds should be done with the use of especially small swabs that are usually 
commercially available and intended for use in human paediatrics. Where these are not available, the 
collection of fresh faeces may serve as an alternative. Similar swab samples can be pooled (i.e. cloacal 
swabs with cloacal swabs, oropharyngeal swabs with oropharyngeal swabs), and most commonly 
pooling of 5 or 11 samples, but specific swab types should be used (Spackman et al., 2013). 
The samples should be placed in isotonic phosphate-buffered saline (PBS), pH 7.0–7.4 with antibiotics 
or a solution containing protein and antibiotics. The antibiotics can be varied according to local 
conditions, but could be, for example, penicillin (2000 units/ml), streptomycin (2 mg/ml), gentamycin 
(50 µg/ml) and mycostatin (1000 units/ml) for tissues and oropharyngeal swabs, but at five-fold higher 
concentrations for faeces and cloacal swabs. It is important to readjust the pH of the solution to 
pH 7.0–7.4 following the addition of the antibiotics. It is recommended that a solution for transport of 
the swabs should contain protein to stabilise the virus (e.g. brain–heart infusion, up to 5% [v/v] cattle 
serum, 0.5% [w/v] bovine albumen or similar commercially available transport media). Faeces and 
finely minced tissues should be prepared as 10–20% (w/v) suspensions in the antibiotic solution. 
Suspensions should be processed as soon as possible after incubation for 1–2 hours at room 
temperature. When immediate processing is impracticable, samples may be stored at 4°C for up to 
4 days. For prolonged storage, diagnostic samples and isolates should be kept at –80°C. Repeated 
freezing and thawing should be avoided. 
The preferred method of growing influenza A viruses is by the inoculation of specific pathogen free 
(SPF) embryonated chicken eggs, or specific antibody negative (SAN) eggs. The supernatant fluids of 
faeces or tissue suspensions obtained through clarification by centrifugation at 1000 g are inoculated 
into the allantoic sac of three to five embryonated SPF or SAN chicken eggs of 9–11 days‟ incubation. 
The eggs are incubated at 37°C (range 35–39°C) for 2–7 days. Eggs containing dead or dying 
embryos as they arise, and all eggs remaining at the end of the incubation period, should first be 
chilled to 4°C for 4 hours or overnight, and the allantoic fluids should then be recovered and tested with 
a screening test (such as haemagglutination [HA] test), influenza A type-specific test (such as agar gel 
immunodiffusion test [AGID] or solid-phase antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays 
[ELISA]) or influenza A subtype-specific test (such as haemagglutination inhibition [HI] and 
neuraminidase inhibition [NI] tests) or a molecular test to detect influenza A specific nucleic acid 
signatures (such as real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction [RT-PCR] test) as 
described later (see Section B.3.2). Detection of HA activity, in bacteria-free amnio-allantoic fluids 
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Commercial diagnostic test kits are available but limited. Reagents required to conducts PCR, serology is also 
limited in many developing countries. Technology for characterization of strains is quite advanced, but sometimes 
lacking behind in developing countries. Four types of commercial test kits exist including: Antibody detection 
ELISA, PCR, lateral flow devices and antigens for HI available or they are in development.  The Australian Animal 
Health Laboratory (AAHL) has developed H7N9 primers, probes and HI antigen tests for H7N9 for use is South and 
Southeast Asia. 
The main gaps include the need for cheap, stable and sensitive tests fit for purpose and that are applied in the 




Prior to 1997, H5N1, H7N9 and H9N2 have been most commonly associated with human morbidity and mortality. 
The case fatality rate for H5N1 and H7N9 virus infections in humans is much higher compared to that of seasonal 
influenza infections. Most H5N1 and H7N9 viruses are resistant to adamantine antiviral drugs, which are not 
recommended for use. 
H5N1 
The H5N1 virus subtype, a highly pathogenic AI virus was first reported in humans in 1997 during a poultry 
outbreak in Hong Kong SAR, China. Since its widespread re-emergence in 2003 and 2004, this avian virus has 
spread from Asia to Europe and Africa and has remained endemic in poultry in some countries, resulting in the 
loss of millions of poultry, several hundred human cases, and many human deaths. Outbreaks in poultry have 
seriously impacted livelihoods, the economy and international trade in affected countries. 
The incubation period for H5N1 in humans is longer than for human seasonal influenza ranging from 2 to 8 days 
and possibly as long as 17 days.  Symptoms include high fever, usually with a temperature higher than 38°C, and 
other influenza-like symptoms (cough or sore throat). Diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain, chest pain, and 
bleeding from the nose and gums have also been reported as early symptoms.  The lower respiratory tract is 
greatly affected. 
The primary risk factor for human infection appears to be direct or indirect exposure to infected live or dead 
poultry or contaminated environments, such as live bird markets.  Cooked eggs and meat are safe to eat however 
slaughter, defeathering, handling carcasses of infected poultry, and preparing poultry for consumption, especially 
in household settings, are likely to be risk factors. 
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The H7N9 virus subtype, a low pathogenic AI virus, first infected 2 residents of the city of Shanghai and 1 resident 
of Anhui province, China in March 2013. No cases of H7N9 outside of China have been reported thus far. 
Containment measures, including the closure of live bird markets for several months, have impacted the 
agriculture sectors of affected countries and international trade. 
 
The H7N9 virus particularly affects people with underlying medical conditions, especially in older male patients 
with a history of contact with poultry at live bird markets in urban areas.  The primary risk factor for human 
infection appears to be direct or indirect exposure to infected live or dead poultry or contaminated environments, 
such as live bird markets.  Cooked eggs and meat are safe to eat however slaughter, defeathering, handling 
carcasses of infected poultry, and preparing poultry for consumption, especially in household settings, are likely 
to be risk factors. 
H9N2 
IN 1999 and 2003, H9N2 was detected in two patients with respiratory symptoms in Hong Kong including a 5-year-
old boy [22].  Both recovered but it is important to note that H9N2 shares 6 conserved genes with H5N1 and H7N9.  
H9N2 also results in significant losses to poultry farmers.  H9N2 is therefore worthy of further surveillance for 
both poultry and humans.  
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Incidence and Prevalence in Selected Countries 
Global  
Global, regional and country specific data illustrate that avian influenza in avian species is a seasonal, with peak 
incidence during winter (e.g. Viet Nam) or during rainy season in equatorial countries (e.g. Indonesia). The 
temporal distribution of avian influenza has declined between 2003 and 2014 as shown in Figure 5 however, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Cambodia, China and Bangladesh are still considered to be endemic countries [11]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Spatial distribution of NDV events reported in Africa during 2011. 
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The World Health Organization reports a total 844 human cases and 449 deaths resulting in a case fatality rate of 
53% [6]. 
Of the 20 selected countries of the Livestock Vaccine Innovation Fund, only the following 4 Asian countries have 
reported human cases and deaths due to H5N1 HPAI (Table 5). 
Table 5: Human health impact of H5N1 HPAI in selected, affected countries, 2003-2015 
 
Country Cumulative Cases Cumulative Deaths Case Fatality Rate 
Bangladesh 7 1 12.5% 
Indonesia 199 167 84% 
Myanmar 1 0 0% 






At least 188 AI disease events were reported from 14 selected African countries and 5,497 AI disease events 
were reported from 6 selected Asian countries between 2000 and 2015.  Regional maps for Africa and Asia are 
presented in Figures 6 and 7, respectively [23]. 
 
Incidence in 20 selected countries 
Incidence refers to the number of new cases detected or reported per unit time or per unit of animal-time.  For 
the purpose of this monograph, data is derived from the OIE World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS).  
CAVEAT: OIE WAHIS data must be interpreted carefully since they have a high degree of uncertainty.  The root of 
this uncertainty can be traced to the country level due to the following reasons: 
1. Lack of awareness and capacity to actually detect the disease from local to national levels; 
2. Lack of government transparency to report disease when data exists; 
3. Rotation of OIE country focal points and non-standardized entry of data due to different interpretation of 
reporting criteria and coding; 
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4. Difficulty in defining and applying OIE designated technical terms such as “unit of interest”; “outbreak” and 
“case” can result in different interpretation in counting disease events. 
5. Count data alone (lacking a denominator) must be interpreted with care to avoid over-interpretation. 
 
Methodology 
Data from 2005-2015 was collected from WAHIS queries based on the following criteria: 1) Country only for all 
diseases [24]; and 2) By country and Disease [25][26].  Results from these queries were compared and the higher 
estimate was entered into Table 6.  Data queries for the years 2000-2004 were obtained from an older version of 
WAHIS termed, HandiStatus II [27].  Incidence data are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Prevalence in 20 selected countries 
Prevalence is defined as a count of the number of new and existing disease events reported at, or over a given 
time period, divided by the total number of samples collected.  The denominator permits a more accurate 
estimate of the burden of disease.   
 
Methodology 
Prevalence data (with 95% confidence intervals when available) available for all avian influenza events reported 
in the 20 selected countries for the years 2000 to 2015 are summarized in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 6: Avian Influenza incidence data in 20 selected countries, 2000-2015 (OIE, WAHID 
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail#) (Accessed 19 October 2015) 
 




















                
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 … 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rwanda … … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 35* 14* 36* 0 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Asia 
                
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 225 31 30+ 169 23 2… … … 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 60 10 5 5 12 3 6 5 
Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 1 19 258 1 0 
Southeast Asia 
                
Indonesia 0 0 0 … … … 223 … 1161+ 1047 … … … 462 … … 
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 15 0 0 3 10 2 0 0 4 
Vietnam 0 0 0 3 … 1068+ 36 73 71 46 44 38 48 39 49* 26 
* Includes LPAI 
 
WAHIS Codes 2005-2015 
... No information available for this disease 
0 Disease absent 
+ Disease present with quantitative data but with an unknown number of 
outbreaks 
 
HandiStatus II Codes 2000-2004: 
0 Disease never reported 
... No information available 
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Table 7: Avian Influenza prevalence and incidence estimates for 20 selected countries based on peer 




Apparent Prevalence / 
Incidence Estimate (95% CI) 
Study Design Time Period Reference 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
    
Burkina Faso 2.4% H5 virus positive  Retrospective survey of 
active and passive samples 
from backyard poultry and 
wild birds 
2006 Ducatez, 2007 
Ethiopia NA 
   
Ivory Coast 0.56% for H5; 0.75% for Influenza 
A virus 
Passive prospective virus 
survey of wild birds and 




0 (0-04%) and 0 (0-1.48%) in each 
year 
Active Backyard virus survey  2006-2008 Couacy-
Hymann, 2012a 
0 (0.04–4.79%) Active, prospective, live 




3.65% Influenza A virus 
prevalence among 1042 chickens 
Survey of 44,099 wild birds 
and backyard poultry from 
32 sites in Central and West 
Africa (incl. Ivory Coast) 
2010-2014 Fuller et al, 
2015 
Kenya 0.8% Influenza A virus 
prevalence;  
Prospective, active cross-
sectional study of live 
markets 
2009-2011 Munyua et al, 
2012 
Madagascar 14% (12-16%) individual 
seroprevalence for Influenza A 
Cross-sectional geo-spatial 
survey based on poultry 
seroprevalence 
2008-2009 Guerrini et al, 
2014 
Malawi NA 
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Mali 3.6% virus positive for type A 
influenza and 13.7% seropositive 
Survey of village poultry and 
live markets in high risk 
wildlife area 
2007 Molia et al, 
2010 
AI seroprevalence of commercial 
farms (0%) and village backyard 




2007-2008 Molia et al, 
2011 
 
Very low, year round Prospective wild bird survey 2008-2010 Capelle et al, 
2013 
Mozambique 2.51% Influenza A Positive  Wild Bird survey of wetlands 
in South Africa, Botswana 
and Mozambique 
2007-2009 Cumming et al, 
2011 
Rwanda NA 
   
Senegal 3.5% virus prevalence in wild 
birds in Africa; the highest 
prevalence in Mauritania and 
Senegal; the most frequently 
infected species were Eurasian 
and African ducks.  
Prospective wild bird survey; 
cloacal swab samples from 
captured birds and from 
freshly killed birds provided 
by hunters. 
2006 Gaidet et al., 
2007  
South Africa 2.51% Influenza A Positive  Wild Bird survey of wetlands 
in South Africa, Botswana 
and Mozambique 
2007-2009 Cumming et al, 
2011 
 
6 outbreaks of LPAI in 2014: 306 
cases and 159 mortalities; case 
fatality rate of 51.9%. Cases and 
deaths due to LPAI in South 
Africa also showed reduction by 
94.2% and 89.1%, respectively 
from the previous year.  
 
2014 AU-IBAR Year 
Book, 2014  
Tanzania NA 
   
Uganda Influenza A virus prevalence by 
RT-PCR of 1.1%; seroprevalence 
(ELISA) of 0.8% 
Prospective active cross-
sectional survey of live 
markets 
2010-2011 Kirunda et al, 
2014 
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Zambia 0.39% Influenza A virus positive Prospective wild bird survey  2008-2009 Simulundu et al, 
2012 
South Asia 
    
Bangladesh Attack rates of upazilas 
(subdistricts) of the infected 
districts: 6/1,000 commercial 
farms and 1/100,000 backyard 
flocks 
Retrospective study of risk 
factors 
2007 Biswas et al, 
2008 
Exact Incidence Rate: 0.0703 per 
chicken-day at risk; 
Retrospective cross-sectional 2007 Biswas et al, 
2011;  
23% Influenza A; 0.08% H5 virus 
positive 
Prospective Live market 
surveillance 
2008-2009 Negovetich et 
al, 2011 
Prevalence of avian influenza 
type A virus of 22.05%; 39.76% 
ducks were seropositive AI; 
Extremely low seroprevalence 
(0.09%) of AI H5N1. 
Prospective, active virus and 
serosurveillance of duck 
flocks 
2009-2012 Khatun, 2013 
India 0.17% (0.14-0.24%) 
seroprevalence; 0.12% (0.10-
0.15%) virus prevalence 
Outbreak surveillance (active 
and passive) 
2009 OIE, 2010 
Nepal The incidence of reported AI 
events due to H5N1 and H9N2 in 
Nepal increased by 355%  
Retrospective 
spatiotemporal analysis 
2010-2012 OIE, 2014; FAO, 
2014 
 
Seroprevalence of AI of 27.2%  
(24.6-29.5). Of 62 enrolled farms, 
42% had at least one seropositive 
duck. Ducks older than 1 year of 
age were more likely to be 
seropositive compared to ducks 
<6 months of age [odds ratio = 
2.17 (1.07-4.39) 
Prospective, active, cross-
sectional serosurvey of 
ducks 
2011 Karki et al, 2014 
Southeast 
Asia 
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Indonesia H5 bird level seroprevalence was 
2.6% for ducks; 0.5% for chickens 
in contact with ducks; Duck 
flock–level prevalence of 5.9% to 
24.7% 
Prospective active multi-
stage sampling survey  
2007-2008 Henning et al, 
2010 
Disease detection rate: 3.8 % 
(3.7% to 3.9%) 
Surveillance risk factor 
analysis 
2006-2007 Loth et al, 2011 
Myanmar NA 
   
Vietnam 11.74% of 869 communes with 
significant spatiotemporal 
clustering for H5N1 
Temporal-spatial cluster 
analysis of communes 
2006-2007 Henning, 2009 
10.3% (6-14.5%) seroprevalence 
in unvaccinated poultry 
Cross-sectional survey of 
poultry in Red River Delta 
2008-2008 Desveaux et all, 
2011 
12-50% egg yolk antibody test 
positive for LPAI H3, H6, H8 
Prospective live market 
survey 
2010-2011 Hotta et al, 
2012 
H5 prevalence (6.6%) from ducks 
in the Mekong delta 
Prospective, cross-sectional 
active live market survey of 
ducks 
2011 Phan et al, 2013 
Exact incidence rate of influenza 
type A virus infection was 5 (4-7) 
positive birds per 100 bird-
months at risk 
A prospective cohort study 
of avian influenza infection 
in poultry flocks was carried 
out in the Mekong River 
Delta 





Conclusions of AI incidence and prevalence data in 20 selected countries   
 
Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast are at high risk of continuing re-introduction of H5N1 while Indonesia and Viet 
Nam remain endemically infected.  Significantly, Indonesia data are no longer shared with OIE on an ongoing 
basis due to sensitivities. Conducting surveillance of sentinel chicken flocks near wildlife refuges in Burkina Faso 
and Ivory Coast would be worthy of consideration due to the low rate of detection in wild birds globally. It is also 
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important to monitor of poultry traded to these two countries from other neighbouring countries such as 
Nigeria. There is indirect epidemiological evidence that clade 2.3.2.1 was imported through poultry trade into 
Indonesia, which highlights the importance of mitigating trade risks.  Viet Nam remains a sink for infected 
poultry from China in addition to re-cycling of virus internally within its borders since both clades 1.1 and 2.3.2.1 
are both found in South Viet Nam. 
Limited surveillance and reporting is forthcoming from all countries, particularly India.  India, Nepal and 
Bangladesh also remain at high risk as noted through periodic reporting of H5N1.  Many countries have relaxed 
surveillance for H5N1.  Note that no countries have reported H7N9 outside of China, despite vigorous 
surveillance during 2014 and 2015 in the bordering countries including Viet Nam and Myanmar. 
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Economic and Social Impacts at Global 







Global Impact: Very few studies of transboundary animal diseases (TADs) at the regional level exist. The 
economic impact of the current H5N1 epizootic has been significant, costing tens of millions in 2006 to 
potentially hundreds of billions of dollars currently at the global level [16][29].  Figure 6 depicts countries most 




Figure 6: Countries most impacted by HPAI, 2006-2010 [28] 
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Economic Impact Social Impact Year Reference 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
    
Burkina Faso NA 
   
Ethiopia A livelihoods assessment of the social and economic 
implications of an outbreak of HPAI was commissioned. The 
results of this study were used to develop a compensation 




Ivory Coast NA 
   
Kenya Kenya’s national preparedness plan includes epidemiology 
and surveillance, disease control strategies, laboratory 
diagnosis and research, information, education and 
communication. The main objectives: 1) strengthen the 
influenza surveillance network, 2) assess the impact of 
influenza and benefits of prevention and control  
 
2008 Tiongco, 2008 
Madagascar NA 
   
Malawi NA 
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Mozambique NA 
   
Rwanda NA 
   
Senegal NA 
   
South Africa NA 
   
Tanzania NA 
   
Uganda NA 
   
Zambia NA 
   
South Asia 
    
Bangladesh February 2007-June 2007: 1.6 million chickens were culled 
and further 277,000 died in 287 outbreaks; 2.2 million eggs 
destroyed; 0.8% of poultry lost; 1441 chicks and 733 adult 
birds were culled per farm, resulting in losses of US$589 and 
749 per farm, respectively; Beef and fish prices increased; 





Otte, et al, 2008 
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India A typical backyard chicken keeping household that result 
from culling their chicken flock, one arrives at an estimate of 
about US$ 13.82 after the inclusion of compensation 
payments. 
With an average flock of 8 chickens, a typical 
household lost US$ 11.34 culling, of which US$ 
5.75 would be offset by compensation. The 
forgone income would average about US$ 26, 
raising the total loss per household to US$ 
31.6.  
2008 FAO, 2008 
Nepal NA 
   
Southeast Asia 
    
Indonesia 11 million chickens dead or culled; in 2005, 60% of farms 
stopped their operations. 
More loan requests and less saving in the 
HPAI-infected farms. Direct impact of HPAI was 
also seen by decrease in expenditures for 
education and daily consumption; Levels of 
social relationship, social networking, social 




Basuno et al, 2010 
16.2 million poultry dead or stamped out in control efforts, 
excluding those lost from backyard farms for which no 
accurate estimates are available. Estimated loss was US$16.2 




McMeod et al, 2007 
July 2003 to 24 January 2004 a total of 15 million layers, 2 




Rushton et al, 2007 
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17.1 million poultry (15 million layers, 2 million parent stock 
and 0.1 million broilers) died or were culled between July 
2003 and January 2004; 6% of poultry population lost; 50-
85% price drop for poultry products in January 2004; demand 
decreased by 58% for broiler Day Old Chicks (DOCs) and by 
40% for layer DOCs; prices dropped from US$0.24 (Rupia 
2200) to US$0.02 (Rupia 200) per DOC; 
A survey of 25 small-scale farms that 
experienced HPAI H5N1 in Vietnam found that 
68% of small-scale commercial farms sold 
and/or ate dead poultry  
2003-
2004 
Otte, et al, 2008 
Greatest loss was among backyard village farmers, estimated 
at 30 million households keeping 200 million native chickens 






   
Vietnam World Bank macro level estimates for the HPAI outbreaks in 
Viet Nam of between 0.3% to 1.8% of GDP; $117.5 M total 
loss in poultry production; average losses per farm affected 
by HPAI are between US$70 and $108  
 
2004 Rushton et al, 2007 
Overall economic impact may have cost Vietnam between 
VND 1,500 and 1,800 billion (US$100-120 million), or an 
estimated 0.3% of GDP 
 
2004 World Bank, 2004 
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Loss of 50 million poultry; HPAI-related poultry losses in 2004 
represented 25–30% of the total poultry population; 
Estimated average loss per farm of US$1702 (26.8 million 
Vietnam Dong (VND); 50-60% price drop for poultry products 
in October 2005; Prices of non- poultry meats rose by 30% as 
a consequence of the first epidemic wave in 2004; increased 
damage from golden snails, increased occurrence of viral 
diseases in the spring–winter crop in 2006, and as a result 
lower net incomes  
Measures to help farmers cope with liquidity 
problems were implemented by the 
Vietnamese government and the Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD); Reduced number of outlets available 
to small-scale poultry producers, limiting their 
commercial opportunities to within-commune 
trade and some inter-commune trade, thereby 




Otte, et al, 2008 
 
Employment/income losses for farmers, 
traders and transporters (many small-scale); % 





Women are heavily impacted: manage small-
scale poultry production (CSO; 80% Sector 4); 
Women involved in trading activities (e.g., 80% 




Compensation rate of 30%; The costs of prolonged 





McMeod et al, 2007 
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Prevention and control of avian influenza is deemed a Global Public Good due to the serious health and socio-




OIE defines an Official Control Programme as: “a programme which is approved, and managed or supervised by 
the Veterinary Authority of a country for the purpose of controlling a vector, pathogen or disease by specific 
measures applied throughout that country, or within a zone or compartment of that country” [2]. F.A.O. and O.I.E. 
guidance for the prevention and control of HPAI H5N1 include humane culling of affected stock, movement 
control, disease surveillance, biosecurity, and vaccination. Biosecurity includes isolation, movement controls, 
cleaning, and disinfection, as well as disposal of poultry litter and carcasses are essential to support prevention 
and control. Risk communication, advocacy, public-private partnerships, and compensation are also important 




Health interventions apply three strategies for the prevention and control of diseases including preventing 
exposure, preventing transmission, and enhancing host immunity.  Control is part of prevention since controlling 
the source of virus, prevents further spread.  When culling of affected stock, movement control, disease 
surveillance, biosecurity are not effective enough to prevent endemicity.  Vaccination, although costly is 
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Options and Strategies for Vaccination 
Vaccination induces protection to poultry mediated through humoral, cellular, and innate immunity. The 
immunity that results from vaccination does not provide sterilizing immunity, but it can reduce clinical signs and 
mortality and reduce virus shedding, resulting in reduced contact transmission among poultry. Inactivated 
vaccines are most commonly used against H5N1 virus, including traditional and reverse genetics vaccines; 
however, a number of live-vector vaccines are being increasingly used [29][30]. Key strategic considerations include 
[7][33]: 
 
1. Vaccine quality, selection, non-replicating and regular matching with circulating field strains; 
2. Vaccination strategy – mass/targeted; prophylactic use in breeders/rare breeds; emergency use to 
protect poultry, farmers and public health; selection of target group; 
3. Implementation of vaccination program – public-private partnerships, logistics, procurement, storage, 
cold chain delivery system, quality control (records) 
4. Post-vaccination seromonitoring and evaluation of the vaccination program disease surveillance, and 
operational research studies to assess impact. 
5. Use of multivalent vaccines may be a scientifically valid approach to take when it is possible.  The reality 
in the field is that many economically significant poultry diseases are neither reported nor assessed 
quantitatively.  Vaccine cost as well as farmer and government perception of risk must be carefully 
assessed in order to prioritize resources for sustainable, self-directed vaccination programs.  Needs 
assessments of the primary stakeholders should first be conducted prior to embarking on prevention 
and control through vaccination.  For example, village poultry owners in Bangladesh indicated to FAO 
that infectious bursal disease (IBD) is the top priority poultry disease.  As a result, biosecurity, training 
and surveillance systems incorporated specific measures for IBD and AI.  The use of NDV-AI vaccines can 
be considered depending on the results of an epidemiological risk assessment for both diseases. 
 
A questionnaire in tabular format was sent to Directors of Veterinary Services/Directors General/Chief 
Veterinary Officers on 9 November 2015.   
Government Policies and Public/Private Domains for 20 selected Countries are presented in Table 9. 
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(yes/no) (yes/no) (yes/no) 
Country       Compulsory 
vaccination 

























         
Ethiopia 
         
Ivory Coast OUI PASSIF MAIS 
ACTIF EN CAS 
D’EPIZOOTIE 
OUI NON 
   
NON 
 
Kenya yes Yes, passive no NA NA NA NA no no 
Madagascar 
         
Malawi YES YES (PASSIVE) YES NO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Mali Yes Yes, passive Yes 
      
Mozambique 
         
Rwanda Yes Both Yes Yes Government Official Poultry No No 
Senegal 
         
South Africa 
         
Tanzania yes Yes, 
passive/active 
yes no Not 
done(disease 
has not been 
reported) 
Not done na no no 
Uganda YES NO NO NO NA (never 
vaccinated) 
NA NA NA NA 
Zambia 
         
Bangladesh Yes Yes (targeted 
active) 





         
Nepal yes yes/active yes No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Indonesia 
         
Myanmar yes yes(active) yes no - - - no no 
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Vietnam Yes Yes/Active Yes No Government 
and farmers 
Both Poultry No Yes 
 
 
1Surveillance: is the systematic on-going collection, collation and analysis of data and the timely dissemination of information to those who need to know so that action 
can be taken.  
2Control: a programme which is approved, and managed or supervised by the Veterinary Authority of a country for the purpose of controlling a vector, pathogen or 
disease by specific measures applied throughout that country, or within a zone or compartment of that country
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The categories of avian influenza vaccines are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Categories of avian influenza vaccines manufactured in Africa and Asia 
 
Homologous Inactivated (the same field strain attenuated) 
Heterologous Inactivated (a different N antigen based field strain is attenuated) 
Reverse Genetics H5 Vaccines (genetic-produced strains based on the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase by 
altering the HPAI virus hemagglutinin proteolytic cleavage site) 
Recombinant Vector Vaccines (in-vivo system; the immunogen is produced within the bird host by use of a live 





Products available in 20 selected countries and doses used are presented in Table 11. Detailed historical 
information on vaccine production and use is available between 2004 and 2012 [8]:  China (120 billion); Indonesia 
(3 billion); and Viet Nam (2 billion).  Inactivated vaccines are most commonly used against H5N1 virus, including 
traditional, vectored and reverse genetics vaccines; however, a number of live-vector vaccines are being 
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Commercial vaccines manufactured in Africa and Asia  
 
Commercial vaccines manufactured in Africa and Asia are presented in Table 11 below. A SWOT analysis for each 
category of vaccine licensed in the 20 selected countries is presented below [8][35][36][37]. Costs range from $.03-
$.05 per dose, administered (2007). 
Table 11: List of vaccines manufactured in Africa and Asia. 
 
Specific Vaccines 
Homologous Inactivated (the same field strain attenuated) 
AVIVAC AI H6N2, Inactivated oil emulsion;  DELTAMUNE (Pty) Ltd.; licensed in South Africa 
Jova Zeit 1,7 oil emulsion; Jordan Bio-Industries Center (JOVAC); licensed in Ethiopia  
Jova Zeit 7; Jordan Bio-Industries Center (JOVAC); licensed in Ethiopia 
MEDIVAC AI, Subtype H5N1; Medion Farma Jaya; licensed in Indonesia, Viet Nam 
MEDIVAC ND-AI EMULSION Subtype H5N1; Medion Farma Jaya; licensed in Indonesia 
Vaksimune AI H5N1 oil emulsion; Vaksindo; licensed in Indonesia, Myanmar   
Vaksimune ND AI oil emulsion; Vaksindo; licensed in Indonesia, Myanmar   
Antigen AI H5N1 oil emulsion; Pusvetma; licensed in Indonesia 
Afluvet H5N1 Clade 2.3.2, Pusvetma; licensed in Indonesia 
H5N1 Vaccine Zhaoqing Dahua Agriculture Bio-Pharm Co., Ltd.; licensed in Indonesia and Viet Nam 
H9N2 Vaccine Zhaoqing Dahua Agriculture Bio-Pharm Co., Ltd.; licensed in Indonesia and Viet Nam 
Heterologous Inactivated (a different N antigen based field strain is attenuated) 
*Avian Influenza H5N2; Avimex S.A. de C.V.; licensed in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal 
Newcastle influenza H5N2 (also one with hydropericardium syndrome serotype 4; Avimex S.A. de C.V.; licensed in 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal  
Nobilis Influenza H5N2; Water in oil emulsion; MSD Animal Health; selected countries not listed but was/is used in 
China (past), Indonesia (past), Viet Nam (past) and Bangladesh (current) 
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CEVAC® FLU-KEM H5N2 oil emulsion; Ceva Santé Animale; licensed in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda 
~CEVAC NEW-FLU KEM® H5N2 oil emulsion; Ceva Santé Animale; licensed in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda 
BIO FLU™ H7N1+H5N9 oil emulsion; Merial Italia; licensed in Viet Nam 
H5N2 Vaccine Zhaoqing Dahua Agriculture Bio-Pharm Co., Ltd.; licensed in Indonesia and Viet Nam 
Reverse genetics H5 vaccines (genetic-produced strains based on the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase by 
altering the HPAI virus hemagglutinin proteolytic cleavage site) 
Bird CLOSE 5.1 oil emulsion; Shigeta Animal Pharmaceuticals Inc.; intended for use in Indonesia  
Re-1, Re-3, Re-4, Re-5 monovalent oil adjuvant, reverse genetics; Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Harbin, 
Heilongjiang province, China; licensed in Viet Nam and likely unofficially used throughout S. and S.E. Asia 
Re-1, Re-3, Re-4, Re-5 monovalent oil adjuvant, reverse genetics; Qingdao Yebio Bioengineering Co. Ltd; licensed in 
Viet Nam and likely unofficially used throughout South and Southeast Asia 
Re-1, Re-3, Re-4, Re-5 monovalent oil adjuvant, reverse genetics; Zhengzhou Bio-pharm Co. Ltd; licensed in Viet Nam 
and likely unofficially used throughout South and Southeast Asia 
^Bivalent H5N1 recombinant, oil adjuvant; Merial, China; licensed in Viet Nam 
Recombinant vector vaccines (in-vivo system; the immunogen is produced within the bird host by use of a live 
bacterial or viral vector) 
**Innovac® rND-H5 B1 and H5 H antigens; Avimex S.A. de C.V.; licensed in Nepal, Bangladesh   
VECTORMUNE® AI, genetically engineered Marek's Disease vaccine of serotype 3 (turkey Herpesvirus or HVT) 
expressing Avian Influenza key protective H antigens; HVT serotype 3 is presented in a frozen cell associated form; 
Ceva Santé Animale; trial use in Bangladesh 
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Commercial vaccines imported into Africa and Asia  
 












2015 2014 2013 2012 
Burkina Faso 
       
Ethiopia 
       
Ivory Coast 
       
Kenya 
       
Madagascar 
       
Malawi 
       
Mali 
       
Mozambique 
       
Rwanda 
       
Senegal 
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Tanzania 
       
Uganda NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Zambia 
       
Bangladesh Novilis H5N2 390,500 402,500 - - 
 
 
Vectorimmune H5 - 15,709,000 9,524,000 210,000 
 
 
Re-6 H5N1 - 11,436,000 23,936,500 11,769,000 
 
India 
       
Nepal 
       
Indonesia 
       
Myanmar No No No No No No No 
Vietnam 
  
• Intervet (Nobilis 
Influenza H5) 
• Laboratory Avi-Mex 
SADe CV (Mexico) (K-
New 5 – Killed 
recombinant vaccine 
against ND and Avian 
influenza subtype H5) 
• Boehringer Inhejhem 
- 151.823.500 193.238.500 186.850.000 
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Vet (H5N2 inactivated) 
• P.T. Medion 
• Zoetis 
• Merial Nanjing Animal 
Health 
• Harbin 
• QYH Biotech Ltd-
Lonza Group 
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There are many vaccines for avian influenza subtypes available. Top candidates for Inactivated heterologous 
monovalent, inactivated combination bivalent, bivalent vector vaccine models are presented below: 
 
Target Product Profile:  Inactivated heterologous vaccine model 
 
Attribute 
Minimum (*Avian Influenza 
H5N2, Avimex S.A. de C.V.) 
Ideal 
Antigen H5 (Heterologous N2); 
A/Chicken/Mexico/232/94/CPA  
Bivalent H5/H9 
Indication for use prevention, control avian 
influenza subtype H5 
same 
Recommended species poultry – chickens, turkeys Including ducks 
Recommended dose 0.5ml; 16% of crude antigen of 
108.0 CEID50% ml  
Maximum – ideally 0.2 ml 
Pharmaceutical form killed AI Type A, subtype H5N2, 
of chicken embryo origin 
same 
Route of administration subcutaneous, neck mucosal ideally 
Regimen – primary vaccination 10 days of age or older 7-10 days 
Regimen – booster 2nd in 3 weeks; as needed every 6 months 
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Epidemiological relevance and 
use for smallholders 
Potential use in Asia for 
smallholders 
collect baseline data; H5 vaccine for Asia and 
Africa; H9 also for smallholders in Asia 
Recommended age at first 
vaccination 
10 days 7-10 days 
Onset of immunity not specified 4-7 days 
Duration of immunity not specified 4-6 months minimum 
Expected efficacy not specified > 90% of challenged birds 
Expected safety not specified 100% of challenged birds 
Withdrawal period 42 days 28 days 
Special requirements for animals Proper injection away from 
head - granulomas 
Training vaccinators 
Special requirements for persons Tissue reaction from self 
injection of oil 
Effective adjuvant but non-reactive to humans  
Package size 500 ml 100 ml 
Price to end user $ 0.03-0.05 US $ 0.03-0.05 US 
Storage condition and shelf-life as 
packages for sale 
Store between 2-7 C (35-45
F). Do not freeze or expose 
product to direct sunlight.  
 
thermostable 
In-use stability Shake often; Stable for 3 weeks 
for transportation purposes at 
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Target Product Profile: Inactivated, bivalent combination vaccine model 
 
Attribute 
Minimum (~CEVAC NEW-FLU 





La Sota NDV 
May require B1 or slightly higher pathotype 
to match field challenge 
Indication for use immunization of susceptible 
chickens against Newcastle 
Disease and Avian Influenza type 
H5 
Immunization and protection against NDV 
and H5 HPAI 
Recommended species chickens gallinaceous poultry and ducks 
Recommended dose 0.5ml  Maximum – ideally 0.2 ml 
Pharmaceutical form La Sota strain of Newcastle 
Disease virus type A subtype 
H5N2 Avian Influenza Virus in 
inactivated form with oil 
adjuvant; BEI inactivation 
May require B1 or slightly higher pathotype 
to match field challenge;match H5 with 
field strain 
Route of administration subcutaneous, neck mucosal ideally 
Regimen – primary vaccination broilers, breeders and laying-
type pullets at 8 to 10 days of 
age.  
Same 
Regimen – booster for breeders and laying type 
pullets, repeat the vaccination at 
i) 6 to 8 weeks of age; ii) and 
revaccinate them 3 weeks before 
the onset of the lay, between 16 
to 20 weeks of age. 
One booster after the primary, then 
periodically according to titers 
Epidemiological relevance and use 
for smallholders 
potential use in Asia and Africa 
for smallholders 
collect baseline data; also require DVE 
vectored vaccine for ducks in Asia 
Recommended age at first 
vaccination 
8-10 days 7 days ideally 
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Onset of immunity not specified 4-7 days 
Duration of immunity not specified 4-6 months minimum 
Expected efficacy not specified > 90% of challenged birds 
Expected safety not specified 100% of challenged birds 
Withdrawal period not specified 28 days 
Special requirements for animals not specified No tissue reaction 
Special requirements for persons Tissue reaction from self 
injection of oil 
Effective adjuvant but non-reactive to 
humans  
Package size 500 ml 100 ml 
Price to end user $ 0.03-0.05 US $ 0.03-0.05 US 
Storage condition and shelf-life as 
packages for sale 
Store vaccine between +2°C and 
+8°C or 35°F and 45°F; protect 
from light; do not freeze 
thermostable 
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Target Product Profile:  Recombinant vector vaccine model 
 
Attribute 
Minimum (**Innovac® rND-H5; 
Avimex S.A. de C.V.) 
Ideal 
Antigen NDV B1 core with LPAI H5 
antigen inserted: H5 subtype 
called VIA Innovac® ® RND-H5 
match NDV pathotype to local field strains  
Indication for use Immunization of healthy birds Prevention and control of NDV and AI in 
poultry 
Recommended species Chicken boilers and breeders develop non-replicating DVE vector for ducks 
Recommended dose Not specified  
Pharmaceutical form ENC, B1 strain, which have been 
inserted genes coding for the 
hemagglutinin H5 VIA, 
propagated in SPF chicken 
embryo and lyophilized 
Match NDV strain and AI subtype for 
epidemiological situation 
Route of administration Ocular (primary), spray, 
drinking water (boosters) 
same 
Regimen – primary vaccination Broilers, the use of the 
vaccine 1 day of age and older 
is recommended  
 
Same regimen but also suitable for native 
“local” breeds 
Regimen – booster Revaccinate broilers between 
10 and 28 days old if needed; 
Layers and breeders: In 
replacement chicks, two to 
three applications are 
recommended vaccine before 
the onset of lay, with an 
interval of 3 to 5 weeks apart 
and every 2 to 3 months as 
needed. 
Community mobilization and ownership 
required to maintain schedule, including 
incentives 
Epidemiological relevance and use 
for smallholders 
potential use in Africa and Asia 
for smallholders 
collect baseline data; also require DVE 
vectored vaccine for ducks in Asia 
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Recommended age at first 
vaccination 
One day old same 
Onset of immunity not specified 4-7 days 
Duration of immunity not specified 4-6 months minimum 
Expected efficacy not specified > 90% of challenged birds 
Expected safety completely harmless to birds, 
even at 10 times the normal 
dose ocular route and 100 
times the normal dose 
intramuscularly  
100% of challenged birds 
Withdrawal period not specified 28 days 
Special requirements for animals once the vaccine used burn, or 
immerse the container and 
unused contents in a 
disinfectant solution 
Non replicating 
Special requirements for persons it is safe and harmless to 
poultry, wild birds, mammals 
and man 
Verify claim 
Package size Blister of 10 vials 1000 doses 
each 
Blister of 10 vials 100 doses each 
Price to end user $ 0.03-0.05 US $ 0.03-0.05 US 
Storage condition and shelf-life as 
packages for sale 
Store in the dark at 2  C and 
7  C (35  F 45  F).  
Avoid freezing and exposure 
to direct sunlight.  
 
thermostable 
In-use stability Once the bottle is opened, 
use the entire contents; do 
not store bottles with partial 
content for future use. 
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Key Conclusions Related to Vaccination 
Short-term Solutions:  Inactivated AI vaccines are still effective, produce good titers and can be applied to short-
lived poultry.  One dose might work for short-lived birds.  Proper delivery of vaccine to smallholder with 
community engagement is a key gap to overcome logistical challenges for the safe and effective delivery of 
vaccine. 
Medium-term Solutions: Some replicating and especially non-replicating recombinant vector vaccines hold 
promise to minimize barriers to wider and more timely legal licensure, registration and use, particularly for 
bivalent NDV-AI combinations for chickens and other gallinaceous poultry. 
Long-term Solutions: There are two main needs:  1) develop a greater variety of non-replicating vector models, 
which can be scaled up rapidly, and are environmentally safe; and 2) development of a safe, non-replicating 
effective bivalent duck virus enteritis-avian influenza (DVE-AI) vaccine for ducks, particularly in Asia. 
  
Avian Influenza | Monograph 04 













This monograph uses an evidence based approach consulting primary referenced studies which summarize key 
points and considerations for undertaking successful vaccine development.  Reporting bias presents a significant 
handicap for estimating country based risk as explained under section 3.  Reporting bias is due to lack of 
transparency from government officials, lack of incentive to report (low or no compensation paid) and also 
because farmers themselves ignore or do not report disease.  It is common for village poultry owners to eat 
recently dead or sick poultry due to food scarcity.  Community engagement is therefore a critical consideration 
for any vaccination initiative.  As such the prevalence studies are likely of more use, however they must be 
evaluated and further examined as to the sample sizes and study deigns used, since these greatly affect 
interpretation of the findings.   
Conclusions for short-, medium- and long-term approaches are based on three prevalent or newly developing 
vaccine models since change will occur during the life of the Project. 
Gaps in knowledge or capacity impacting strategic planning and effective implementation 
The following gaps are highlighted in relation to vaccine development and sustainable field implementation for 
avian influenza: 
1. The extent of AI vaccine used which does not conform to OIE standards; 
2. The need for environmental assessments of replicating recombinant vector vaccines; 
3. The need to develop non-replicating recombinant vector vaccines in order to speed up vaccine licensing 
and registration; 
4. Standardized laboratory diagnosis of AI using approved reagents, including primers; 
5. Lack of active and passive surveillance systems; 
6. Effective programmatic implementation of Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) 
strategy in more developed and less developed countries remains a challenge.  Challenges are related to 
policy uncertainties as well as laboratory, field epidemiology and operational capacity limitations. 
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7. China, Viet Nam and Indonesia have ceased to vaccinate smallholder poultry.  Sustainable models for 
successful community engagement to improve logistics and delivery of AI vaccine for smallholders.  
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